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THE UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY
ACT: ORIGIN AND INTENT
WILLIAM P. CANTWELL*
In the fall of 1979 the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws established a committee' to
draft a proposed uniform act dealing with marital property.
In July 1983, the Conference promulgated the Uniform Mari-
tal Property Act (UMPA).2 In August 1984, the American
Bar Association approved the UMPA as appropriate for those
states desiring to embody its concepts in their substantive
law.
The drafting committee was an uninstructed one. In that
posture it set its agenda and developed its approach. An early
principle it settled upon was that sharing should be the essen-
tial characteristic of the spouses' relationship toward their
property.4 That principle appeared to the committee to be
well established, given the development of equitable distribu-
tion patterns developed in the last decade and a half in the
divorce area. 5 A sharing principle is confirmed by the increas-
* B.A., Williams College, 1942; J.D., Yale University, 1948; Partner, Sherman &
Howard, Denver, Colorado. The author wishes to thank Brian Formella for his prepa-
ration of the footnotes for this Article.
1. Members of the Special Committee who acted for the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in preparing the Uniform Marital Property Act
included: George C. Berk, William P. Cantwell, Thomas E. Cavendish, John C. Dea-
con, Peter J. Dykman, Bion M. Gregory, M. King Hill, Jr., William C. Hillman, Linda
Judd, William J. Pierce, Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Henry D. Stratton, and Richard V. Well-
man.
Members of the Review Committee were: K. King Burnett, Jack Davies, Susan S.
Engeleiter, and Glee S. Smith.
Serving as Advisors to the Special Committee were: Thomas M. Boykoff, Edwin H.
Frank, Jr., John Goode, Beverly A. Groner, Robert Halfyard, Ruth-Arlene Howe, and
Mary Moers Wenig.
2. The Uniform Marital Property Act was approved and recommended for enact-
ment in all the states in July 1983 at the annual conference of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
3. A.B.A. Res. No. 103 (1984)(approved by the A.B.A. House of Delegates on Au-
gust 8, 1984, in Chicago, IL).
4. See UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. 21, 24-25 (Supp.
1985) [hereinafter cited as UMPA].
5. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1983-84). Entitled "Property Division," section
767.255 states in relevant part:
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ing attention given in recent years to the elective rights of
Upon every judgment of annulment, divorce or legal separation. the court
shall divide the property of the parties and divest and transfer the title of any
such property accordingly. . . .Any property shown to have been acquired by
either party prior to or during the course of the marriage as a gift, bequest,
devise or inheritance or to have been paid for by either party with funds so
acquired shall remain the property of such party and may not be subjected to a
property division under this section except upon a finding that refusal to divide
such property will create a hardship on the other party or on the children of the
marriage, and in that event the court may divest the party of such property in a
fair and equitable manner. The court shall presume that all other property is to be
divided equally between the parties, but may alter this distribution without regard
to marital misconduct after considering:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) The property brought to the marriage by each party.
(2r) Whether one of the parties has substantial assets not subject to divi-
sion by the court.
(3) The contribution of each party to the marriage, giving appropriate
economic value to each party's contribution in homemaking and child care
services.
(4) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
(5) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased
earning power of the other.
(5e) Whether equity requires reimbursement of one spouse by the other
because of certain transactions during the marriage.
(6) The earning capacity of each party, including educational back-
ground, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from
the job market, custodial responsibilities for children and the time and ex-
pense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party
to become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to
that enjoyed during the marriage.
(7) The desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live
therein for a reasonable period to the party having custody of any children.
(8) The amount and duration of an order under s. 767.26 granting main-
tenance payments to either party, any order for periodic family support pay-
ments under s. 767.261 and whether the property division is in lieu of such
payments.
(9) Other economic circumstances of each party, including pension bene-
fits, vested or unvested, and future interests.
(10) The tax consequences to each party.
(11) Any written agreement made by the parties before or during the
marriage concerning any arrangement for property distribution; such agree-
ments shall be binding upon the court except that no such agreement shall be
binding where the terms of the agreement are inequitable as to either party.
The court shall presume any such agreement to be equitable as to both par-
ties.
(12) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case deter-
mine to be relevant.
Id. (emphasis added). Cf Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 81, 318 N.W.2d 391, 396
(1982) ("'The division of the property of the divorced parties rests upon the concept of
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spouses at death 6 and in the liberalization of state and federal
death tax laws applying to interspousal transfers.7
Accepting sharing as a fundamental organizing principle
was not itself sufficient enough to start the drafting process.
Both equitable distribution and elective shares at death create
a certain form of sharing. These concepts suggested the sec-
ond major issue faced by the drafting committee - sharing,
yes, but sharing when? The answer to that issue came after
concluding that an appropriate law dealing with spousal eco-
nomics ought not to be one dealing only with the pathological
events of marriage - divorce or death. A proper law ought to
be one designed for application throughout the marriage, in
the best of times as well as the worst of times. Hence the an-
swer to the question: sharing from the inception of property
rights resulting from spousal effort during marriage.8
From the two basic principles of sharing and sharing im-
mediately, the entire balance of the drafting project flowed. If
property rights of both spouses are to attach to wealth as it
arises, a statutory scheme needed to be developed to deal with
those property rights originating inside the marriage as well as
outside.
The inside relationship raised questions ultimately re-
solved by provisions dealing with the good faith duty of the
spouses toward each other;9 interspousal remedies for interfer-
ing with property rights or violating the good faith duty;1"
marriage as a shared enterprise or joint undertaking.' ") (quoting Lacey v. Lacey, 45
Wis. 2d 378, 382, 173 N.W.2d 142, 144 (1970)).
6. See, eg., Wis. STAT. § 861.05 (1983-84). Entitled "Right to elective share; effect
of election," section 861.05(1) states in relevant part:
(1) If decedent dies testate, the surviving spouse has a right to elect to take the
share provided by this section. The elective share consists of one-third of the net
probate estate, reduced by any property given outright to the spouse under the
decedent's will. As used in this subsection, net probate estate means the net
estate as defined in s. 851.17, including any property passing by intestate succes-
sion as well as under the will, but without deduction of the estate taxes.
7. See, e-g., I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1985); Wis. STAT. § 72.15(5) (1983-84) ("Any trans-
fer to a surviving spouse is exempt from the tax imposed by this subchapter.")
8. See UMPA, supra note 4, prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. at 22-23.
9. See id. § 2(a), 9A U.L.A. at 28. "The duty is between spouses, and is one of
good faith." Id. § 2 comment. See also 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at
Wis. STAT. § 766.15(1)).
10. See UMPA, supra note 4, § 15, 9A U.L.A. at 15. See also 1983 Wis. Laws 186,
§ 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.70).
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contractual options to create liberal customizing opportunities
by way of marital property agreements;" reasonable restric-
tions on gifts to third parties that might otherwise impair the
property interest of one spouse or the other;"z and a defined
set of management and control rights.1 3
The outside relationships were seen as occurring princi-
pally with creditors, purchasers, and donees. They were
solved with respective provisions: (1) indicating the accessi-
bility of spousal property to creditors;' 4 (2) addressing bona
fide purchaser situations;' 5 and (3) creating a voidability as-
pect to certain gifts, subject to a statute of limitations. 16 The
bona fide purchaser provisions are cognate with the manage-
ment and control provisions and essentially tie directly to
traditional separate property concepts of a title-based transfer
and third-party protection system. That was no accident, but
rather a very deliberate response to suggestions from many
sources during the drafting process. The central thrust of
those suggestions was that every effort be made to avoid the
necessity of joinder of both spouses in the majority of transac-
tions involving third parties. The response is in the structure
of UMPA that basically accords management and control to
the spouse with title to marital assets 17 and provides that a
bona fide purchaser acquiring assets from that spouse acquires
a title free from the claim of the other spouse.'8
11. See UMPA, supra note 4, §§ 3, 7(b), & 10, 9A U.L.A. at 28, 34, 37-38. "[A]
couple may opt-out, opt-in, or do both in part. Custom tailored marital property re-
gimes are possible." Id. § 3 comment. See also 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codi-
fied at Wis. STAT. §§ 766.17, .58).
12. See UMPA, supra note 4, § 6, 9A U.L.A. at 29. See also 1983 Wis. Laws 186,
§ 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.53).
13. See UMPA, supra note 4, § 5, 9A U.L.A. at 32-33. See also 1983 Wis. Laws
186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.51).
14. See UMPA, supra note 4, § 8, 9A U.L.A. at 34-35. See also 1983 Wis. Laws
186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. §§ 766.55, .56).
15. See UMPA, supra note 4, § 9, 9A U.L.A. at 36-37. See also 1983 Wis. Laws
186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.57).
16. See UMPA, supra note 4, § 6(b), 9A U.L.A. at 34. See also 1983 Wis. Laws
186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.57).
17. See UMPA, supra note 4, § 5(a) & comment, 9A U.L.A. at 32, 33. See also
1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.51(1)).
18. See UMPA, supra note 4, § 9(c), 9A U.L.A. at 37. See also 1983 Wis. Laws
186, § 47 (to be codified at § 766.57(3)).
The comment following section 9 states in part:
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Articulation with respect to divorce property division pro-
cedures is essentially handled by going to the door of the di-
vorce court but not through it. The drafters foresaw the
opportunity for adopting jurisdictions to leave their existing
procedures entirely in place. If an adopting jurisdiction al-
ready allowed the court to divide all property of the spouses,
then that plan would continue, and the marital property
would simply be part of that universe of divisible assets. 19 For
example, if a given state's procedure had a lesser reach, such
as a defined type of divorce-only marital property, that could
easily be integrated with UMPA. The important point, from
the drafters' perspective, was to permit complete latitude and
not to urge in any respect that marital property must neces-
sarily be divided in precisely equal ratios, unless that was al-
ready the preference of an adopting state.
Disposition at death was similarly left for determination
by an adopting state.20 A lengthy comment on the varying
possibilities is included in the official draft of UMPA, and it
urges an adopting state to give the most careful attention to
the interaction between the equal vested property interests of
the spouses in the marital property with existing intestacy,
elective share, and spousal allowance provisions.21 The intent
was that local preferences be canvassed and used in integrat-
ing UMPA with an adopting state's overall inheritance
pattern.
There are many other particularized provisions of UMPA
that deal with more limited subject matter. These include
such matters as special title forms,22 life insurance,23 em-
Third parties will deal with the spouse or spouses who manage and control, and
that in turn depends on which spouse "holds" marital property. When one who
satisfies the bona fide purchaser requirements deals with a spouse who has man-
agement and control rights under section 5, the transaction is free from the claim
of the other spouse. This section. . . cannot be altered by a marital property
agreement.
UMPA, supra note 4, § 9 commentary at 21, 9A U.L.A. at 37.
19. See UMPA, supra note 4, prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. at 24. See also 1983 Wis.
Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.75).
20. See UMPA, supra note 4, prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. at 24. See also id. § 18;
1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.77).
21. See UMPA, supra note 4, § 18 comment, 9A U.L.A. at 51-54.
22. See UMPA, supra note 4, § 11, 9A U.L.A. at 39-40. See also 1983 Wis. Laws
186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.60).
23. See UMPA, supra note 4, § 12, 9A U.L.A. at 40-42. See also 1983 Wis. Laws
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ployee benefits,24 personal effort expended on individual prop-
erty,25 and mixing marital property with other property.26
In the adoption process, UMPA received two full readings
by the entire Conference, as well as a partial reading, over the
period from 1981 to 1983. Countless suggestions arose in
these readings, and many of them were included in the
promulgated draft. Liaison was continuous with concerned
sections of the American Bar Association and with several
other groups, including the American College of Real Estate
Lawyers and the American Land Title Association. The vari-
ous drafts of UMPA were furnished to more than fifty law
professors teaching in the covered areas. A program on
UMPA was offered at annual meetings of the American Bar
Association in 1981, 1982, and 1983, and a program was also
offered at the annual convention of the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools in 1982. A public hearing of which dozens
of interested organizations were given notice was held in
Washington, D.C., in 1983. Continuing liaison with activities
in Wisconsin occurred as a result of membership on the draft-
ing committee of Peter Dykman of the Wisconsin Legislative
Reference Bureau.
In the final analysis, it is fair to ask what this effort is
designed to accomplish. UMPA responds to a challenge set
forth in the report of the 1963 President's Commission on the
Status of Women.27 That challenge was formed in these
words:
Marriage is a partnership to which each spouse makes a dif-
ferent but equally important contribution. This fact has be-
come increasingly recognized in the realities of American
family living. While the laws of other countries have re-
flected this trend, family laws in the United States have
lagged behind. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that
186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAi. § 766.61).
24. See UMPA, supra note 4, § 13, 9A U.L.A. at 43. See also 1983 Wis. Laws 186,
§ 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.62).
25. See UMPA, supra note 4, § 14(b), 9A U.L.A. at 44. See also 1983 Wis. Laws
186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.63(1)).
26. See UMPA, supra note 4, § 14(a), 9A U.L.A. at 44. See also 1983 Wis. Laws
186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.63(1)).
27. C6MMITrEE ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1963).
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during marriage each spouse should have a legally defined
and substantial right in the earnings of the other spouse and
in the real and personal property acquired as a result of such
earnings, as well as in the management of such earnings and
property. Such right should survive the marriage and be le-
gally recognized in the event of its termination by annul-
ment, divorce, or death. This policy should be appropriately
implemented by legislation which would safeguard either
spouse against improper alienation of property by the
other.28
28. Id. at 18, quoted in UMPA, supra note 4, prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. at 21.
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